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The Late Roman Republic was divided into two political factions, the Populares and the 
Optimates, who quarreled on whether the voice of the people through votes in popular 
assemblies should have greater weight in government than the opinions and wisdom of 
the Roman Senate who, being composed of elite Roman aristocrats, believed were more 
qualified than the average Roman citizens to govern. A parallel idea of representation 
exists in the United States, in which two schools of thought emerge, the Trustee Model of 
Representation versus the Delegate model. In this project, I analyzed the language and 
rhetoric utilized by ancient Roman authors and thinkers regarding these two political 
factions and compared those trends to political writings from 18th century America that 
were concerned about representation. Ultimately, I was able to find a strong connection 
between the ideologies of the Roman conflict between the Optimates and Populares and 
the American debate over whether a Trustee or Delegate model of representation is more 
effective. There has been significant research done on the Late Roman Republic and the 
conflicts that categorized America’s founding, but my research was able to connect the 
two political contexts and hopefully, provide a foundation for future research on the links 









Both the United States Senate and the Senate of the Roman Republic share similar 
schools of thought regarding the obligations of an elected senator, focusing mainly on 
whether these politicians represent the interests of the common people or if these 
politicians should make decisions on what they deem “for the good of the whole” nation 
(Rehfeld). While the Roman Senate differs from the United States Senate in that it is not 
a legislative body, the argument between the Populares and the Optimates is similar to 
the American conflict between a delegate model of representation, in which elected 
officials should directly represent and vote on the interests of their constituents, versus a 
trustee model of representation, where politicians are elected because they possess the 
“most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of society” and 
therefore, are more qualified to make decisions on behalf of the American people 
(Madison). Extensive research exists on the history of the Populares and the Optimates 
and the influential leaders attributed to each party, and yet there seems to be a lack of 
research regarding how we can take that conflict and translate it to modern models of 
democracy and representation. 
In the late Republic of Rome, the political life was categorized by two schools of 
thought, the Optimates, who believed that the advice and approval of Roman Senators 
should be a more important step for the creation of a law, and the Populares, who 
believed that the votes of the Roman populace as whole through assemblies should hold a 
greater weight in the creation of law. On a similar note, when the United States 
government was being constructed for a second time, after the failed Articles of 
Confederation, the two political factions, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, argued 
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over how American citizens should be represented in a legislative institution. The 
Federalists argued for a trustee model of representation which draws comparisons to the 
Roman Optimates in believing that American senators should make decisions based on 
their own wisdom and what they deem fit. On the other hand, the Anti-Federalists 
supported a delegate model of representation claiming that American senators should be 
defined by their constituents and make decisions based on the interests of those 
constituents (Ginsberg 53). I believe that this research will recognize the ways in which 
both of these approaches to representation have merit but will also highlight the pitfalls of 
entrusting a large amount of political power in the hands of one group of individuals, 
whether it be political elites or the common people. 
For my research, I used primary and secondary analysis to gather information 
regarding these two political ideologies in the Roman and American contexts. I will focus 
on the writings, letters, and speeches of key Roman politicians such as the great Roman 
orator Cicero and Julius Caesar, along with works of other Roman historians and 
previous research focusing on the Roman Republic. Specifically, I used content analysis 
to code for specific words, phrases, or sentiments in their original Latin that were being 
utilized to describe the political factions, and then translated those ideas such as “liberty,” 
“interests of the commons,” or “virtue” (Cicero 225). On a similar note, I then coded for 
these words and concepts in the American context. Specifically, I looked at early 
documents such as the Constitution and the Federalist Papers, but also analyzed 
contemporary sources as well, such as public opinion polls and demographics of 
American legislators. Ultimately, I was able to find similar trends in language and 
rhetoric used by these two factions, the Optimates and the Populares, and those used in 
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18th century America regarding representation. This suggests a significant link between 
the political culture of the ancient Romans at the end of the Republic and the concerns of 
the framers of American democracy.  
 
Historical Context 
Most of the limited information we have about the beliefs, actions, and prominent 
figures of the Optimates and Populares comes from the written accounts of the either the 
leaders who aligned themselves with a specific ideology or from historians who are 
documenting these political debates. Therefore, for my research, it seems most effective 
to analyze the rhetoric and arguments posed by these men and compare the consistency or 
distinctions between the ways in which they describe the values or logic of their own 
ideology or the competing ideology. I often found that these political actors often 
reference or try to emulate the actions of previous Roman politicians like the Gracchus 
brothers or Lucius Sulla. Therefore, this historical context is ultimately important to keep 
in mind in order to help inform the context in which Roman historians and politicians like 
Sallust and Cicero are writing about these two groups while also identifying the events 
that initiated the emergence of these political ideologies in the first place.  
In this section, I am going to highlight the historical events that serve as the 
backdrop and reference points for the ancient primary sources that I coded for. In order to 
understand the ideological foundations of the groups of Optimates and the Populares that 
categorized the late Roman Republic, it is significant to acknowledge key moments in 
Rome’s history that played a role in the conception of these two political factions, dating 
back all the way to Rome’s founding in 754/753 BCE when 100 senators were chosen as 
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senators and ultimately, created the patrician class. The conflict between the Roman 
aristocracy, or patrician class, that served as the ruling body of Rome, and the common 
people, is one that had always been present since the birth of Rome, and subsequently, 
incited significant political conflicts between the two populations of people. Specifically, 
a period of conflict between the two classes called the Struggle of the Orders categorized 
Rome’s early Republic which ultimately, led to the creation of the tribune of the plebs, a 
key political office that helped assure that the plebeians were protected from the political 
abuse of the patrician magistrates. Additionally, the prolonged conflict that later arose 
between political heads Sulla, who fought to preserve the aristocratic Senate and its 
superior judgement, and Marius, who headed the Populares factions, only heightened and 
exacerbated the argument over which body of people ought to have a greater influence in 
governance, the aristocratic senators or the plebeians. Years later, during the Civil War of 
49 BCE, a war that ultimately led to the collapse of the Roman Republic, the two major 
political figures fighting against one another, Caesar and Pompey, were heavily 
influenced by the political opinions and values, specifically regarding the role of the 
Senate, of Sulla and Marius, therefore making it crucial to highlight their contributions to 
this debate. Ultimately, all of these key historical moments left a significant legacy, 
especially the division between the aristocratic and plebian classes, that remained well 
into the late Roman Republic. Overall, recognizing and analyzing these events helps 
inform how these two political ideologies were shaped and the framing of each side’s 
arguments. 
 Moving past the first 200 years or so after Rome’s founding in which seven kings 
ruled, the foundation of Rome’s republic began to take shape as early as 504 BCE, with 
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figures like Cicero claiming that this expulsion of kings was “synonymous with liberty” 
(Le Glay et al. 32). It is during this time that conflicts between the aristocratic members 
of Roman society and the common people begin to arise and produce political unrest 
within the state. As previously mentioned, this aristocratic class was thought to be the 
descendants of forefathers or “patres” of Rome, and so therefore, like a vicious cycle, 
these individuals, who were from the wealthiest and most powerful families of Rome, 
were then systematically placed in positions of power in Rome like public and religious 
offices and the Senate. This gave way for the patrician class to abuse their power and 
neglect the interests of the plebeians.  
Before jumping into the extensive history of this struggle, it is important to 
outline the unique functions of the Roman Senate since it differs significantly from the 
structure and expectations of the United States Senate. Specifically, during Rome’s 
period of monarchy, this Roman Senate served as an advising body to the kings. Once 
Rome expelled the kings and transitioned to a system of annually elected officials, the 
Senate then acted as an advising body to the elected magistrates. A distinction to make, 
which will inform the rest of my research, is that the Senate did not possess the ability to 
create laws, and instead, were only able to pass decrees regarding the Senate’s opinion on 
what the magistrates ought to do, which in itself held significant weight. In Rome, laws 
were voted on and enacted by the popular assemblies, but the opinion of the Senate was 
usually given before any piece of legislation became law. Therefore, the Senate still held 
a major influence over the creation of laws and the actions of the magistrates and could 
enact that influence in order to repress the common people especially since it had major 
influences over the State’s finances and helped determine the distribution of wealth from 
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the treasury. Ultimately, those, both poor and wealthy, who contested this political 
organization, that clearly favored the patricians, were labelled as “plebeians” even though 
this term was later understood to simply represent the “common people” (Le Glay et. al 
43). Understandably, these plebeians, who represented the majority, grew angry at this 
arrangement, and in turn, engaged in political protest in order to effect change.  
 These conflicts, which began around 494, would come to be known as the 
Struggle of the Orders in which the plebeian class rebelled against the patrician’s 
monopoly on both political and religious power, and their greater access to resources. In 
the early formation of the state and in wake of the removal of the kings, the plebeians 
found themselves plagued with “bad harvests” and a “shortage of food” along with the 
burden of significant debt, which served as a stark contrast to those of the patrician class 
(Le Glay et al. 45). The plebeians began to push back against the aristocratic rule. On one 
specific occasion, the plebeians, in protest of their “lack of representation” in political 
processes and “heavy debts,” retreated to the Sacred Mount, depriving the patricians of 
their manual labor workers and threatening the formation of a new state. Therefore, this 
forced the patricians to create the position of Tribune of the plebs, which would become a 
significant political office for the common people to have their interests represented in 
the formation of Roman law (Le Glay et al. 43).  
Overall though, the patricians persisted in their attempts to exclude the plebeians 
from political participation, and specifically the consulship, which is the elected head of 
state of the Republic which is voted on annually. For example, a specific patrician-born 
hero and general named Coriolanus who lived during the 5th century BCE was 
determined to maintain the patrician class’ rule over the plebeians. In 491 BCE, Rome, 
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who was experiencing a grain shortage, had just received an abundance of grain from 
Sicily and the Senate was deciding on what price it should be sold to the common people. 
Coriolanus argued that the plebeians should not receive any grain unless they “restore to 
the Senate its ancient rights” meaning abolish the offices of the tribunes (Livy 2.331). He 
despised the “plebeian magistrates” and clearly believed that the plebeians were not fit 
for governance (Livy 2.331). Understandably the plebeians were outraged by Coriolanus’ 
actions, but even the Senate found Coriolanus’ opinions and plans to be a bit too harsh, 
and ultimately, he was put on trial and convicted, although the Senate did try to argue for 
a lighter sentence. This is an example of the tumultuous relationship between the 
plebeians and the patricians. In 367 BCE, due to the Licinio-Sextian plebiscite, plebeians 
gained greater access and influence in political decisions by requiring that one of the two 
consuls be a plebeian. This was important considering that before this time the plebeians 
were excluded from these high offices, and it allowed for the interests of the common 
people to have better representation in governance. While plebeians were able to make 
significant strides in gaining entry to Roman governance, the divide between the elite 
patrician class and the common people still remained.  
 Moving forward in time to 133 BCE, two political figures, Tiberius and Gaius 
Gracchus, enter the political arena in hopes of alleviating the hardships placed on those 
lower-class Roman individuals who were, at this time, facing economic and social 
problems. Specifically, the plebeian class, who were mainly dependent on agriculture for 
their livelihoods, were being required to serve in Rome’s military service for a significant 
period of time, and in their absence, their land would either fall to shambles or be sold off 
to the wealthy. Furthermore, those who purchased this land would then profit even more 
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off of this transaction by working the land with slave labor. Once elected as Tribune of 
the Plebs, Tiberius Gracchus attempted to propose legislation that would solve these 
seemingly unjust actions that were being inflicted upon the lower classes. Believing that 
the Senate would reject his proposal due to the fact that many of the wealthy senators 
were profiting off the current arrangement, Tiberius took his proposed legislation straight 
to the popular assembly, completely bypassing the Senate’s approval. This action 
highlights a key distinction that highlights the foundation of the Populares, which is 
whether the opinions of the people should have a larger weight in law-making than the 
authority of the Senate.  
Ultimately, this action, along with his desire to run for Tribune a second time, 
caused the Senate to deem Tiberius as dangerous and possessing too much “ambition” 
and he subsequently was murdered. It also set a precedent in the early Roman Republic. 
The issue was not necessarily centered around his desire to pass legislation that would 
benefit the plebeians like the land reform bills, but instead, it was the manner in which he 
did it. He had chosen to break the traditional and understood procedure for how laws 
were created in Rome by going around the Senate’s approval, which in fairness was 
completely legal. The Senate obviously saw him as a threat to their power and influence 
over governance and thought his actions would encourage others to follow suit. 
Therefore, Tiberius was seen as the making of a Tyrant, and his radical actions ultimately 
led to his murder at the hands of the Senate. This is also shows the means by which the 
Senate were willing to utilize in order to repress any opposition or threat to their power. 
In terms of the debate between the Populares and the Optimates, this struggle reveals just 
how much influence the Senate has in dominating any opposing force, and how they can 
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use their rhetoric and position to do so all in the name of what it best for Rome. It is clear 
though that Tiberius’ legacy acted as a catalyst for future populist movements.  
 Following in his brother’s footsteps, Gaius Gracchus, who was also elected 
tribune of the plebs in 123 BCE, focused on reinstating his brother’s law regarding land 
rights, while also attempting to enact other laws to benefit the common people. He too, 
like Tiberius, chose to take these laws straight to the popular assemblies, completely 
bypassing the approval of the Senate. Similarly, ambitious like his brother, Gaius 
attempted to run for his third tribunate. However, after the Senate ordered an ultimate 
decree following the death of a servant to the consul, meaning the consuls were allowed 
to take any actions as long as it is the best interest of the state, Gaius feared for his safety 
and took refuge on Aventine hill where he and his supporters were killed (Le Glay et al. 
113). The actions of the Gracchus brothers and their deaths are significant to the 
formation and foundation of the Optimates and Populares. These two brothers set the 
precedent that the implementation of laws was not contingent on the Senate’s approval, 
and the interests of the common people would be better represented in governance if they 
were to evade the Senate’s advising which had become an accepted and integral part of 
Roman governance. There reason for doing this is twofold. While they truly did wish to 
pass legislation that ultimately aided to poorer Roman citizens, they ultimately thought 
the Roman Senate had excess power and that the authority of the Roman governance 
ought to be based in the votes of the people in assemblies.  
 After these events, two “fluid” groups “within the wealthy elite” emerged, with 
the major conflict being whether to take laws or other political decisions straight to public 
assemblies for public approval and by-passing the Senate, just like Tiberius Gracchus did, 
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or to present these ideas first to the Senate for approval. This is a key frame of reference 
for understanding the beliefs and motivations for the Optimates and the Populares. 
Ultimately, the legacy and conflicts left by the Gracchi brothers maintained into the late 
Roman Republic, and prominent political figures and orators, such as Cicero, often 
referred back to these incidents as either support for the importance of the general 
masses’ influence in law-making or evidence of the dangerous and foolish events that 
happen when decisions are left in the hands of the people.  
 The Gracchus brothers highlighted a key debate within Roman governance 
regarding whether the Senate’s approval was really necessary for the creation of laws and 
if assemblies could be used to circumvent this aristocratic institution. The conflict 
between political figures Marius and Sulla, that caused a war and a further divide among 
the people of Rome, seems to present both sides of this debate. Marius was a man who 
was not born into nobility or the patrician class but was instead sponsored and groomed 
by a wealthy patron family, the Metelli, to enter the political realm and rise to the 
senatorial class. Specifically, Marius’ fame is mainly attributed to his incredible military 
successes during the war against Jugurtha and the German wars, which ultimately 
garnered him such popularity that he held six consulships between the years 108-100 
BCE. However, his popularity began to decline near the end of his final consulship in 99 
BCE in which he became entangled in a conflict between other Populares political 
figures, Lucius Saturninus and Gaius Glaucia, who were attempting to pass legislation in 
favor of “land allotment” to the veterans of the wars which Marius led (Le Glay et al. 
127). Assuming that the senators would discredit the law, the men who created it 
included a requirement that the senators take an oath in order to obey the vote, or else 
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they would be banished from Rome. Ultimately, Marius took the oath, much to the 
dismay of other senators such as his former patron Quintus Metellus. Additionally, 
Marius was blamed for a handful of future riots and disturbances which contributed to his 
decline, as he was blamed for the disturbances caused by Saturninus who enlisted a gang 
to kill his political rival for the consulship in 99 BCE (Le Glay et al. 127). Overall 
though, it was clear, due to his humble upbringing and his position on legislation that 
benefitted the common people, that Marius supported and considered himself a member 
of the Populares. It is important to understand the trajectory of Marius’ life in order to 
grasp how he was viewed by the Roman people and the Senate, and to provide context to 
his conflicts with Sulla.  
 Lucius Sulla, on the other hand, presents a stark contrast to Marius, and is 
described as the major leader and supporter of the Optimates. In contrast, he was born 
into an old aristocratic family, the Cornelii. Interestingly, Sulla actually served as 
quaestor under Marius’ command during the war against Jugurtha, which is thought to be 
the origin of tension between the two political leaders. While Marius’ political career 
began to deteriorate, Sulla’s began to rise, and he quickly gained a reputation as being 
both a great military leader, being accredited for the victory of Jugurtha, much to Marius’ 
dismay, and “a wise diplomat” (Le Glay et al. 130). Ultimately, their conflict comes to a 
head when Marius, with support of the Populares who favored him because of his support 
for pro-plebeian legislation and because he was not a born aristocrat, claimed the 
command of the military charge against the king of Pontus, Mithridates, whereas Sulla, as 
the current consul and with the support of the Senate, had the actual power to lead a 
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campaign. In result, Sulla marched legions onto Rome and successfully reclaimed the 
campaign on Mithridates while simultaneously banishing Marius from Rome.  
Ultimately, Marius died soon after, which led to the height of Sulla’s political 
impact. After defeating Cinna and Cinna’s formed army who had attempted to exile him 
from Rome in 83 BCE, Sulla took control of the city and began to implement his 
“proscription list” which called for the confiscation of resources and or execution of any 
people who he deemed “enemies of the state” such as any magistrates who served under 
Marius (Le Glay et al. 134). Sulla’s political actions after this time period seem to 
solidify his allegiance and belief in the Optimates. Notably when Sulla was granted the 
position of dictator for an undecided timeframe, which in a Roman context was a 
temporary post of usually about 6 moths appointed by the Senate who maintained sole 
military power during a time of emergency, he attempted to restore more power into the 
institution of the Senate. He required that the Senate must approve any legislation before 
it was presented to the assembly of the people while also restricting the powers of the 
Tribunes of the plebs by taking away their ability to veto Senate decisions in order to 
restore the superiority of the Senate’s decisions and to repress any opposition.  
Overall, the conflict between Sulla and Marius proves that the divide between the 
elite and the common people in Rome still persisted nearly 600 years after Rome’s 
founding, and affirms that there was still no unanimous opinion on the Republic’s system 
of law-making. Additionally, the conflict between these two figures heavily influence and 
inform the civil war between Pompey and Caesar that I will touch on more later in my 
research, as both of these men had personal and political ties to Sulla and Marius. 
Ultimately, these key historical moments led to the creation of the Optimates and 
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Populares, where political life was categorized by those aristocratic men who believed 
that the advice and approval of Roman Senators, because of their greater wisdom and 
character, should be a more important step for the creation of a law, and those who 
believed that the votes of the plebs or the common people should hold a greater weight in 
the creation of law. In the same vein, the United States has experienced a similar debate 
in terms of representation and the roles and expectations of our elected officials.  
Debate of Representation in the United States 
More specifically, both the United States Senate and the Senate of the Roman 
Republic share similar schools of thought regarding the obligations of an elected senator. 
In the United States, the debate over the duties and expectations of representation truly 
arose around the 18th century around the time of the American Revolution even though 
early mentions of this conflict can be traced all the way back to the 13th century and the 
Magna Carta (Rehfeld 217). At the time of when the Magna Carta was written, 
representatives did not possess any authority really to create laws or act at all, and 
instead, they were there mostly to “assent to the King’s demands” on behalf of their town 
(Rehfeld 217). However, the actual terms “trustee” and “delegate” came about in the 18th 
century, with figures like Edmund Burke, who was a British statesman and political 
thinker, writing about their opinions on the matter. More specifically, Burke argues in 
favor of a more trustee model of representation, and states in his 1774 “Speech to the 
Electors at Bristol at the Conclusion of the Poll” that a representative owes its 
constituents their “judgment” and even further argues, that your representative “betrays 
you” if he sacrifices that judgement to “your opinion” (Burke). Burke saw representatives 
as having the superior qualifications to make decisions on behalf of the people, which 
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ultimately is foundational to the argument of the trustee model. Therefore, it is clear that 
a debate regarding the expectations of representation was beginning to take shape near 
the end of the 18th century, and the founders of the U.S. were taking ideas straight from 
Britain.  
Early American politicians like James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and 
Thomas Jefferson debated whether elected officials ought to represent the interests of the 
common people or if these politicians should make decisions on what they deem “for the 
good of the whole” nation which seems similar to the debates between the Roman 
Optimates and Populares (Madison). Two political ideologies, the Trustee model of 
representation and the delegate model, emerge after the American Revolution regarding 
the responsibility and responsiveness of the newly created elected officials under the new 
Constitution. Furthermore, this ultimately contributed to the beginning of the United 
States’ first two political factions which was an act that Washington himself warned 
against.  
Specifically, the Articles of Confederation was the founder’s first attempt at 
establishing a precedent for governance in America, favoring a structure that 
concentrated power in the hands of the states and limited the power and interference of 
federal government. This emphasis on a weak central government came from a place of 
fear, as the founders did not wish to allow an avenue for the rise of an ambitious tyrant 
who held an excess of power as was the case with Great Britain under the rule of the 
monarch. However, this complete shift, under the Articles of Confederation, to a 
governance that was composed solely of a legislative branch, lacking an executive and 
judicial, presented the fledgling country with a handful of complications that would 
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require a complete rewrite of the document and would ultimately alter the way in which 
representation was interpreted in the United States.  
For example, the Articles made it difficult for the federal government to exercise 
any power over that of state government, especially since the states were responsible for 
the enforcement and implementation of the laws. Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation had no power to “levy taxes or regulate commerce” and they were unable 
to secure a national army because each state had their own militia (Ginsberg 38). 
Additionally, all 13 states only had one singular vote in Congress, and it required the 
unanimous approval of each state to amend the Articles of Confederation which proved 
to be a roadblock. In terms of representation specifically, legislators from each state acted 
more as messengers of the decisions being made by their state’s legislators as opposed to 
actors who were independently thinking and creating legislation with the interests of the 
entire nation in mind. Because most power was found at the state level, these senators 
were both selected by state legislators and also susceptible to an “immediate recall” by 
state officials, along with being compensated directly from state treasuries (Ginsberg 37). 
Overall, under the Articles of Confederation, each state “retained its sovereignty, 
freedom, and independence” which in result made Congress ineffective and powerless in 
enforcing its will, especially with the absence of an executive or judicial authority to 
reinforce the legitimacy of its decisions (Articles of Confederation). Ultimately, this 
primary document created and perpetuated a non-unified nation where states were 
competing with one another and in their own personal interests. Therefore, it became 
apparent that a new document and form of government needed to be constructed.  
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During this process of creating, amending, and ratifying the U.S. Constitution, 
new avenues for representation were created which ultimately redefined and challenged 
the way in which senators and elected officials were expected to act and make decisions 
in governance. The most notable change is seen through the establishment of a bicameral 
legislation where the framers decided to compromise and adopt two proposed plans 
regarding how states would be represented in this new Congress, the Virginia Plan and 
the New Jersey Plan. Overall, this decision established that the Senate would consist of 
only two representatives from each state, and the House of Representatives would be 
composed of varying number of state legislators based on their specific population size. 
No longer were legislators bound to the wills of the State governments, but instead, the 
framers understood their role now to make independent decisions based on the best 
interests of their constituencies, whether that be the State or a specific district, and to the 
nation as a whole. The establishment of these two houses would allow for more unity 
between rural citizens who preferred a weaker federal government and those who fought 
for a more centralized government as it allowed for states to still retain influence in 
lawmaking, but also concentrated power more on the national level and in result, 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the institution.  
As previously mentioned, under the Articles of Confederation, members of 
Congress were basically just conduits of the wills and decisions of the state legislators 
and were not acting or proposing legislation based on their own expertise or for the whole 
of the nation. However, with power now concentrated on the federal level under the 
Constitution through the newly constructed legislative branch, representatives were now 
responsible with making decisions for the unified nation and keeping checks on the other 
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branches along with still representing the interests of their own state. For example, the 
question arose whether these representatives should base their decisions on the opinions 
of their constituents or the opinions of state legislators or even their own personal 
opinions. This gave rise to two competing ideologies which resemble the conflict that 
categorized Roman politics regarding the most effective method of representation in 
governance regarding whether the Roman Senate possessed a greater wisdom that the 
common people to make decisions on behalf of the state.  
Two early political factions, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, argued over 
how American citizens should best be represented in a legislative institution. The 
Federalists argued for a trustee model of representation, which draws comparisons to the 
Roman Optimates, by believing that American senators should make decisions based on 
their own wisdom and what they deem fit. Ultimately, the aims and responsibilities that 
frame the argument for a trustee model are that the primary goal of legislation should be 
“the good of all,” and that elected representatives ought not to be reliant on “external 
sanctities” or “the prejudices and acrimony of the party,” but instead utilize their own 
judgment and wisdom when making decisions and policy (Rehfeld 218). Basically, they 
argued that we elect and entrust these individuals to public offices on the basis that 
because they possess some greater expertise and “merit,” they are more equipped to make 
decisions for the nation as a whole and not solely based in the views of their constituents 
(Madison). This is significant in the sense that it draws strong connections to the ways in 
which the Roman Senate saw themselves as being morally superior and “the best men” 
which ultimately made them better suited for governance.  
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On the other hand, the Anti-Federalists supported a delegate model of 
representation claiming that American representatives should be defined by their 
constituents and make decisions based on the interests of those constituents, aligning 
themselves more with the ideology of the Populares (Madison). Furthermore, the 
argument in favor of the delegate model example serves as the antithesis to that of the 
trustee model in which the goals of the legislation should be for “a particular electoral 
constituency,” and that those constituents, and citizens as a whole, ought to be the 
ultimate judge on what is deemed good for the nation (Rehfeld 218). Similarly, the 
supporters of the delegate model believe that representatives should be responsive to the 
interests of their constituents and reflect those interests in legislation and governance. In 
terms of framing these ideas, pure delegates are not to express their own personal opinion 
in governance, but rather solely the opinion of their constituents (Cooper et al. 175). On 
the other hand, trustees are believed to possess some “objective criteria” and personal 
experience on which they base their decisions (Cooper et al 175). Therefore, although the 
terms “trustee” and “delegate” have their roots in more modern research regarding 
representation, the sentiments remain the same to the arguments that categorized 
America’s founding.  
As seen in the context of the Roman Republic, significant issues arise with both 
of these schools of thought. For example, some scholars of political science would argue 
that it is difficult to judge the aptitude and success of elected officials who are not acting 
as a delegate, since it proves easier to measure the effectiveness of elected officials using 
the delegate model because one would simply have to compare their voting patterns to 
the opinions of the constituents (Rehfeld 218). Similarly, it could be argued that the 
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trustee model of representation promotes the election of elite, wealthy, and educated 
individuals who could potentially be blind to the needs and experiences of the lower-class 
citizens or the interests of the majority of citizens which was definitely a fear held by the 
Antifederalists (Brutus, Federal Farmer). On the other hand though, Andrew Rehfeld asks 
the question of whether citizens are either not educated enough about basic political 
processes or possess the necessary and informed worldview needed that will influence 
and ultimately enhance their decisions and lawmaking (Rehfeld 224). While both sides of 
the argument have valid concerns, it is clear that both sides have the same goal in mind 
which is to create a system that best represents the interests of the people and also 
maintains the values of the country.  
Overall, in this last couple decades, state and national legislators in the United 
States are “more likely to characterize themselves as trustees,” which is how framers of 
the Constitution like Hamilton and Madison intended it to be, believing that we choose to 
elect representatives who ought to use their discretion and wisdom to make decisions for 
the good of the nation as a whole (Cooper et al. 175). However, it also seems that the 
fears originally held by the pro-agrarian Antifederalists, like the idea that these 
representatives will solely belong to an elite class have come into fruition especially 
since, as of 2014, the median net-worth of a member of Congress is over “one-million” 
dollars (Ballotpedia). I hope that my findings and comparisons of these two models in the 
United States context will ultimately support future research regarding the most efficient 
and ethical method of representation.  
There are many factors that have been identified in recent research that attempt to 
explain why legislators choose to adopt either a more trustee or a more delegate model of 
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representation. For example, if a representative is being elected in a state or district that is 
more heterogenous, that individual will be more likely to adopt a mindset of trustee 
representation since it would be virtually impossible to identify a “single district opinion” 
(Cooper et al 178). Other variables that may alter a legislator’s perspective on 
representation and their accountability to the interests of their constituents could be 
distance from the state capital, a salient minority identity such as gender or race, or the 
strength of one’s own ideology (Cooper et al. 178). Overall, it is clear that representation 
is still being debated in the United States today, and even more so in the wake of Donald 
Trump’s presidential campaign and subsequent election in which his campaign was based 
on appealing to the general masses and criticizing the political establishment and elites in 
D.C, and hopefully, my research will speak to future arguments regarding the 
effectiveness of representation in the U.S. 
While the Roman Senate differs from the United States Senate in that it is not a 
legislative body, the argument between the Populares and the Optimates is similar to the 
American conflict between a delegate model of representation, in which elected officials 
should directly represent and vote on the interests of their constituents, versus a trustee 
model of representation, where politicians are elected not to mirror the opinions of their 
constituents, but because they possess the “most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to 
pursue, the common good of society”(Madison).  
Differences in the Function of the Senate 
While it may be tempting to conflate the Senate of the Roman Republic with the 
United States Senate, it is crucial to highlight that these two institutions actually operate 
quite differently in their respective nations and ultimately, enlist different procedures to 
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influence lawmaking. The main difference between these two governing bodies is that the 
Senate of the Roman Republic is not a legislative institution and does not have the direct 
power to create and establish laws. When analyzing the argument of which body of 
individuals, either the senators or the mass population that they are governing on behalf 
of, should carry more power in the creation of laws, it is beneficial to understand the 
specific government structure, such as the processes and political offices, utilized by the 
Romans in order to best understand the argument of the Optimates and the Populares. 
Where the Roman Senate serves mostly as an advising body who possesses no ability to 
pass or enact laws, the United States Senate is a full legislative institution. This 
distinction is important to make because it helps inform my research and understand 
where these two different debates between the Optimates and the Populares and the 
trustee and delegate model diverge whereas the Optimates are concerned with attaining 
more power in the creation of laws meanwhile in the U.S., the Senate is the sole 
institution making laws. 
In the United States, the Senate, along with the House of Representatives, serves 
as a legislative body in which senators and elected officials, representing different 
constituencies across all 50 states, are tasked to create and pass federal laws. In order for 
a law to be enacted, the proposed bill must be argued and approved in both legislative 
houses. The Senate specifically was allotted the power to ratify treaties and approve 
presidential appointments while the House had the ability to originate revenue bills 
(Ginsberg 45). Additionally, senators were elected for six-year terms, as opposed to only 
two-year terms for those in the House and were required to be thirty years of age, likely 
to ensure that elected officials are qualified and have the experience to adequately serve a 
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longer term in the Senate which seems to support the Trustee model. The United States’ 
legislative branch was designed not only to hold the most power in governance so as to 
avoid the concentration of power in the executive and provide an avenue for a tyrant, but 
it also was meant to appease both the Federalists and Antifederalists, who were arguing 
over the expectations of representation in their newly independent country.  
On the one hand, the House of Representatives was meant to speak to and calm 
the fears of the Antifederalists who were worried that the interests of the common people 
would be undermined by the interests of elites. Since the House is composed of 
representatives whose quantity are dependent on the population size of a specific state 
and who represent specific districts within that state, it is meant to be more “directly 
responsible” to the people and in turn, better represents the direct opinions of the people 
themselves (Ginsberg 45). However, on the other hand, the Senate was originally created 
with the goals of framers like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in mind so as to 
ensure that qualified individuals were put in these positions and were not subject to the 
pressure of the masses and factions. It was composed of elected officials who are elected 
for longer and staggered terms in which only a certain number of new legislators are 
chosen each year as so as to avoid mob rule within the Senate. This system ultimately 
serves to ensure that the institution is not falling to the whims of the people since the 
composition of the Senate changes partially each election year. Additionally, senators 
were originally appointed by state legislators in order to again deter against the will of 
people whose ever-changing opinions were thought to be a threat to the stability and 
legitimacy in government. The 17th Amendment altered this practice though, and instead 
ensured that from that point on senators would be elected by a popular vote, creating the 
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system that is utilized today. Ultimately though, the current United States Senate, unlike 
the Senate of the Roman Republic, is an institution meant solely for legislative purposes.  
 In terms of the Roman Republic, the structure of governance acts as a stark 
contrast to that of the United States, especially within the institution of the Senate. 
However, the Romans created a system that depended on the election of officials, and 
utilized aspects of our modern concept of democracy, such as the fact that each citizen 
received one vote. In an attempt to replace the king in the 6th century BCE, the founders 
of the Roman Republic established the positions of two consuls, who would possess the 
highest executive authority in the state. The consuls had the power of imperium or the 
control of the military, and also were positioned as the head of the Senate and had the 
ability to propose legislation. The terms of the consul lasted only one year, but they were 
eligible for re-election in later and eventually non-consecutive years, and they were 
elected by the popular assemblies. Finally, up until a piece of legislation passed in 342 
BCE requiring that one of the consuls be a plebian, only members of the patrician class 
were permitted to serve as consul. The position of the consul worked closely with the 
Roman Senate and played a major role in politics and the future conflicts between the 
Optimates and Populares.  
Through this legislation, Roman governance was mandating a form of descriptive 
representation, which means that a representative expresses the same characteristics or in 
this case socioeconomic status as the people they are serving. This differs from the 
United States where there is no requirement that representatives must be descriptive of 
their constituents, and this brings up a significant facet of the debate regarding the 
Optimates and the Populares and the Trustee model and the Delegate model. While it 
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seems that the Populares and the Antifederalists argue that the will of the people ought to 
be directly represented in governance, neither one of these ideologies seem to necessitate 
that an elected official “look like” their constituents in order to represent them.  
Additional officials called magistrates were elected in order to handle the 
administrative and financial aspects of Rome. These positions include aediles, quaestors, 
and praetors, and these positions were elected by large assemblies of the people such as 
the comitia centuriata and the comitia populi tributa. These assemblies, which each 
enlisted their own unique voting system, each elected different political offices which 
provides insight into which assembly and which elected officials are thinking more about 
the interests of the Roman people at whole. For example, the comitia centuriata elected 
the most senior magistrates such as the consuls and the praetors and voting in this 
assembly was dominated by Rome’s wealthiest men who held more voting power. On the 
other hand, the comitia populi tributa elected minor magistrates like the aediles, tribunes, 
and quaestors, and in this assembly, which represented the “populus divided into tribes,” 
voting power was equal and not based on wealth (Le Glay et al. 59). Therefore, it seems 
likely that in assemblies like the former, the interests of the people were better 
represented, and minor magistrates might be more responsive to the will of the people. 
Additionally, it is significant to acknowledge the in assemblies like the comitia centuriata 
where the wealthiest citizens had greater influence, the interests of the aristocrats were 
being reflected in these magistrates. However, maybe this was acting in a similar fashion 
to the United States Senate when the State legislators would appoint the Senators so as to 
ensure that the elected offices are not falling to the wills of the people. Overall though, 
Roman assemblies were the places in which citizens could cast their ballot, especially 
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since Rome functioned as a direct democracy in the sense that citizens themselves casted 
their vote to ratify the proposals coming out the Senate and make them laws. However, 
citizens themselves could not create laws. It was in these assemblies where legislation 
would be proposed and then subsequently voted on and enacted.  
Resulting from the Conflict of the Order between the patricians and the plebeians, 
a plebeian assembly was created called the concilium plebis and from this came the 
creation of a new political office called the tribune of the plebs. Two tribunes would be 
elected for one-year terms in which their sole purpose was to protect the interests of the 
plebeians and guard them from the abuse of the aristocratic class. Along with the ability 
to propose legislation and the law ensuring the protection of the tribunes, the most 
notable power of the tribunes was their ability to veto the actions and acts of the 
magistrates, including the consul, and the Senate. The establishment of the tribune of the 
plebs marked a major event for the Populares, and this political office plays a significant 
role in ensuring that the voice of both the people and the Populares is represented in 
governance.  
Finally, the Senate occupied a significant space in Roman government even 
though it did not technically possess the ability to pass and enact laws. As opposed to the 
function of the United States’ Senate as a legislative body, the Roman Senate acted more 
as an advisory body in which the senators would offer their opinion through decrees 
called senatus consulta to the magistrates. While these decrees did not hold any legal 
power whatsoever, the opinion of the Senate held a large weight and influence in Roman 
governance, and most of the time their opinions were enforced. The Senate had a large 
control on the actions of the magistrates, especially considering that many senators were 
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appointed to the Senate after serving as a magistrate of some kind and played a large 
hand in advising military and financial matters. However since laws were voted on in 
popular assemblies, it was not theoretically necessary to consult the Senate in order to 
vote or pass a law, which was shown in the case of Tiberius Gracchus who, as tribune of 
the plebs, took his legislation straight to the plebeian assembly knowing they would 
supported his cause, and completely side stepped the approval of the Roman Senate. 
Additionally, the Roman Senate was mainly composed of members of aristocratic Rome, 
even though in later years plebeians were permitted to be appointed to the Senate.  
Overall, the Roman Senate and their opinion held a large weight in Rome and 
their guidance was usually obeyed and subsequently translated into law. However, it is 
crucial for this research to understand that the United States Senate is not synonymous to 
the Roman Senate, and in fact, they both function differently. In the same vein though, it 
is clear that the same questions could be proposed in both contexts regarding whether one 
group of people is more equipped than another group to make decisions on behalf of a 
nation. In the case of the United States, whether representatives should be making 
decisions based on their own beliefs or the beliefs of the people while in the case of 
Rome, the conflict surrounds whether the decree of the Senators ought to be more 
influential in lawmaking. Ultimately, my research attempts to draw similarities between 
these political debates in both contexts in order to better understand which form of 
representation if most effective.  
The Framing of the Optimates and Populares 
As previously outlined, the majority of evidence regarding the existence of the 
Populares and the Optimates and their specific ideologies comes from the written 
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accounts of prominent, and generally elite, politicians and historians. Individuals like 
Caesar and Cicero, who were figureheads for the Populares and Optimates respectively, 
were writing first-hand accounts of the political happenings and opinions of the time. 
Meanwhile, historians like Livy and Sallust were reflecting back and documenting their 
take on key moments in Rome’s history which inadvertently includes commentary on the 
nature of the competing political factions of the time. Therefore, it is from these writings 
that I determine the key values and issues that defined these two schools of thought in the 
Late Roman Republic and how the arguments for each group were constructed and 
defended. Ultimately, I identified trends in the language utilized by these ancient authors 
and orators that outlined the strengths and weaknesses of Roman governance, and then 
compared these findings to the language used to talk about representation in the 
American context.  
 For my research, I focused on the primary analysis of letters, speeches, and 
historical accounts written in the first century BCE from four previously mentioned 
sources: Marcus Tullius Cicero, Julius Caesar, Livy, and Sallust. Coding for specific 
words, language, or ideas in these authors in their original Latin, I was able to trace key 
trends that help us categorize the beliefs and values of the Optimates or Populares, along 
with sentiments regarding the way in which Roman government ought to be structured 
and the values on which Rome was founded. In particular, I analyzed six different 
sources: Cicero’s Pro Sestio and Epistulae ad Atticum (Letters to Atticus), Julius Caesar’s 
Bellum Civile, Sallust’s De Coniuratione Catilinae (Conspiracy of Cataline) and Bellum 
Jugurthinum (Jugurthine War), and Livy’s History of Rome in order to determine how 
these authors thought about Roman government ought to be structured. I ultimately 
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identified five categories and those include 1) any language explicitly referring to or 
describing the Optimates, 2) language explicitly referring to or describing the Populares, 
3) language describing the ideals of the Republic or facets of the Republic, 4) language 
outlining good citizens, and 5) language outlining bad citizens. Ultimately, these five 
subsects allowed me to not only define the main arguments that framed the ideologies of 
these two political factions, but also key perspectives on the expectations of the Roman 
government and the Roman citizens which will inform my discussion on American 
governance and representation.  
I will begin by reporting my findings regarding the way in which these ancient 
authors spoke about the Optimates and Populares directly. The majority of my findings 
on this topic came from the two primary sources of Cicero’s Pro Sestio and Caesar’s 
Bellum Civile. These two sources provide interesting distinctions because, as previously 
alluded to in my chapter outlining the historical background of these groups, Cicero 
represents a figurehead for the Optimates while Caesar aligns himself with the Populares 
so therefore these two writings presented two competing depictions of the Roman Senate 
and those who believed it ought to hold the most power. Cicero provides a quite glowing 
description of the role of the Roman Senate and the men who serve in this institution 
while still acknowledging that those acting as Senators are of a different class and do not 
descriptively represent the people who they are governing.  
On a basic level, Cicero directly uses the term optimates multiple times 
throughout the course of his legal speech Pro Sestio, which actually translates to 
“aristocrats” or “the best ones” to reference the group of individuals who make up the 
Roman Senate. Similarly, he makes mention of the optimates explicitly as a group almost 
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ten times in his Letters to Atticus.  Therefore, he does not shy away from conceding that 
the Senate maintains the legacy of the patrician class and is mainly exclusive to elites. 
Interestingly though, Cicero argues against the idea that the Senate are a natio or a 
“breed,” (217) which he states is a term coined by his opponents, and instead he refers to 
these men as delectis preciouses or “picked and chief men,” arguing that there is no 
reason that the people should disagree with the views of these aristocrats (177). The 
historian Sallust acknowledges the legacy of the patrician class referencing how they 
were forced to appeal to the common people in Rome’s early history and how that early 
class division has led to current state of political affairs between the Senate and the 
Roman citizens. Ultimately, the distinction between the aristocratic Senate and plebeians 
is made clear here, and their arguments are further driven home in these authors 
descriptions of the institution of the Senate itself.  
Cicero and Caesar engage quite different language when describing the 
Optimates, the actions of the Senate, and the role the Senate plays in Roman governance. 
As one could predict, Cicero views the Roman Senate as an indispensable institution that 
employs only the best men to  ensure the safety and integrity of Rome. To that point, he 
refers to the men who take part in political affairs, meaning the Senators and magistrates, 
as the boni homines or the “good people”, and he uses this term which seems to be used 
synonymously with the Optimates roughly seven times throughout the course of his 
speech. This comparison of the Roman senators as “good people” seems to argue that this 
group of individuals are morally superior to the rest of the Roman population. The 
implications of this language is to separate the two populations, the Senate and the 
People, and to also promote the argument, whether true or not, that the Senate is not a 
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corrupt institution. He goes on to detail how he views the role of the Senate in which he 
likens them to “defenders of the State” or propugnatores (173) along with fulfilling the 
roles of custodem and praesidum meaning the guardian and the president (225). Through 
these descriptions, it is clear that Cicero perceives the Senate to be the most suitable and 
qualified body of citizens to manage and protect the Roman State and uphold its values 
and foundations. Furthermore, Cicero even goes as far to assert that the optimates or 
aristocrats are the auctores et conservatores civitatis or the “counsellors and saviors the 
State” which seems to be fit in nicely with the narrative of the Optimates in which they 
believe that the Senate possess greater wisdom than the general public that ought to hold 
greater weight in making decisions and creating laws (225). These terms are significant to 
our understanding of the ideology of the Optimates as they seek to argue the moral and 
ethical nature of the Roman Senate and its senators that makes it more suitable for 
governance than the Roman people.  
Caesar paints a different picture of the Optimates and the Senate, highlighting his 
perspective on the institution’s shortcomings and the frequency of immoral behavior 
among these elite individuals who made up the Roman Senate. For context, Caesar is 
writing in the midst of his public conflict with Pompey which eventually turns into a 
Civil War between the two parties. Caesar had spent an unprecedented ten years, 
following his consulship in 59 BCE, as governor of Transalpine Gaul in which he was 
engaging in successful military campaigns into what they called Northern Gaul (Le Glay 
et al. 148). While Caesar and Pompey had formerly been allies with one another in a 
three-way coalition with Marcus Crassus known as the First Triumvirate, their 
relationship soon began to deteriorate for numerous reasons as Caesar began gaining 
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military fame for his work in Gaul while Pompey chose to remarry, only after the death 
of his previous wife Julia who was Caesar’s only daughter, to a woman from the Metelli 
family who were political opponents of Caesar and prominent members of the Optimates. 
By the year 52 BCE, due to a new abundance of violence and unrest, Pompey is 
appointed sole consul and ultimately, aligns himself with the Optimates in the Roman 
Senate. With Caesar’s governorship expiring, the Senate saw this as an opportunity to 
neutralize him and demanded that he lay down his command and release his legions to 
which Caesar himself refused and ultimately requested to run for consul in absentia, so as 
to avoid the legal prosecution he would face if he returned home to Rome. Ultimately, 
while Pompey declared that he would lay down his command if Caesar did, Caesar ended 
up crossing the border and marching his troops across the Rubicon River, establishing a 
civil war.  
Ultimately, Caesar’s Bellum Civile details his perspective of the Roman Senate 
and Pompey regarding their efforts to eliminate him from Roman Politics, along with 
attempting to justify how the actions he took against the Optimates were necessary and 
on behalf of the people. It is clear throughout this commentary that Caesar felt as though 
the Roman people wanted him in office and that the Senate was abusing their specified 
role in governance in order to attain more power. For example, Caesar, interrupting 
Lentulus Spinther who was begging for his life, proclaimed that he did not leave his 
province with the intentions of harm, but instead wished to “restore the tribunes” and “to 
liberate [himself] and the Roman people from the oppression by a small faction” (35). 
This passage alone cements Caesar’s perspective of the Roman Senate, and highlights 
that he feels as though he is responsible to fight on behalf of the people.  
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Therefore, it is understandable that he mainly highlights the Senate’s abuse of 
power in his writings in hopes of exposing their corrupt behavior that contradicts 
Cicero’s moral and superior depiction of the Optimates. Specifically, he outlines 
individual motives for prominent Senators like Lucius Lenutlus whose motives Caesar 
claims for persecuting him were based on personal motives such as becoming a second 
Sulla and gaining summa imperi or “supreme power” (7). He goes after Scipio and argues 
that he only backed Pompey because of his desire to attain "provincarum atque 
exercitum" or provinces and armies. Along that same vein, Caesar claims that the 
Senators prefer to maintain their imperium exercitusque or “power and armies” even it 
means utter confusion and turmoil for the State (7). In terms of the character of the 
Senate, he believes them to be tenuis atque infirmi haec animi or “petty and weak of 
mind,” along with mentioning their harshness, which ultimately presents a stark contrast 
to Cicero’s evaluation (51). This difference in opinions regarding the actions and moral 
composition of these two political factions continues throughout both of these texts in 
their evaluations of the Populares.  
It seems also important to mention as well that Sallust subtly alludes to the 
Optimates at least three times in his text detailing the Conspiracy of Catiline, arguing that 
governance in Rome began to be shift to paucorum potentia meaning the “power of a 
few” which echoes Caesar’s language regarding “the power of a few” and a “small 
faction”  (85). This idea is a critique of the way in which the Senate only are composed of 
a small class of citizens who are the elites, and this group ultimately ends up having a 
larger influence in governance and lawmaking than the common people of Rome who are 
the majority. This concept is important to keep in mind as it will be referenced again in 
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the American context and utilized as an argument against the Federalists and their 
preference of a more elite model of representation.  
Cicero employs quite scathing language when speaking explicitly about both the 
character of the Populares, but also of the actions they commit that ultimately makes 
them ill fit to govern the State properly. He refers to them explicitly as the Populares, 
which could be translated either “Friends of the People” or “The People’s Party,” which 
seems to be presented with a negative connotation. This is important distinction to keep 
in mind as a similar dialogue is employed by the Federalists to describe the 
Antifederalists, along with negative comparisons to Caesar himself. Additionally, I would 
like to point out that this language seems to separate the leaders of the Populares from the 
people themselves which again feeds into the argument of descriptive representation. 
Even though Caesar was a prominent leader for the Populares faction, he too was part of 
the aristocratic class and did not descriptively look like the people of Rome whom he was 
trying the defend. I think it could be argued that this language seems to say that members 
of the Populares are not necessarily the common Roman people, but instead, are 
individuals who are friends to these people and uses their interests to gain power. He 
utilizes this term at least twelve times throughout the excerpt of this legal speech in 
which he engages the ongoing conflict between the two factions.  
After he outlines the glowing characteristics held by the Optimates or the 
aristocrats, Cicero compares those who are seeking to go against these aristocrats, or the 
Senate are audaces homines et perditi or “reckless and abandoned men” who are going 
against the State (171). Additionally, he scolded those actively working against the 
Optimates for their cunctatione ac tarditate or “hesitance and indolence” (173).  From 
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this understanding, he seems to be arguing that those who choose to defy the will of the 
Senate are ultimately hurting the State of Rome, clearly emphasizing the Senate’s 
important and incomparable role in governance. We saw how this played out for the 
Gracchus brothers who chose to go against the Senate, and ultimately, I believe Cicero is 
arguing that these types of individuals threaten to cause revolutions and danger to the 
state of Rome. Additionally, he is clearly identifying the qualities and characteristics that 
make these individuals unfit for advising and influencing lawmaking.  
Cicero continues on by stating that the ways in which leaders of the Populares 
mobilize the people and gain support is only through pretio and mercede or “corruption 
and bribery” (179). This speech argues that the Optimates viewed the leaders of the 
Populares as inciting the masses against the Senate and playing on the fears and 
grievances of the people in order to gain power in governance and eliminate the 
Optimates from governance. From these words, it does not seem like Cicero believes that 
the Populares are even representing the true beliefs of the people, but instead, are buying 
their support in order to undermine the power of the aristocratic Senate. For example, it is 
notable to say that many of the leaders of the Populares faction, like Caesar, had 
aristocratic backgrounds and do not represent the socioeconomic status of the general 
Roman person. Cicero then chooses to drive his point home by calling out by name 
specific Populares leaders who are, in his opinion, immoral such as L. Gellius or L. 
Saturninus. He refers to them as ringleaders and “demagogues” or plebicola in the 
original Latin, along with mad men who flourish in popular esteem and persuasion (187). 
Similarly, he also references key players in the creation of the Populares faction such as 
Gaius Gracchus, along with Marcus Varius, whom Cicero refers to as seditiosis or 
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“revoluntionaries” (173). As previously mentioned, Cicero is using these examples to 
warn against the dangers that occur when the will of the Senate is not followed.  
Providing another and perhaps more objective perspective, the historian Livy also 
mentions Gaius Gracchus, along with his brother Tiberius, in his documentation of 
Roman history, and seems to present a different perspective regarding these early 
politicians. He argues that the Gracchus brothers put the rem publicam or the “public 
good over their own personal interests or “private animosity” (Livy bk.38, 53). Clearly, 
Cicero and Livy had two different opinions regarding who has the best interests of Rome 
in mind with Cicero siding with the Senate. Overall though, Cicero drives his point home 
by highlighting the mentes imperatorum or the “minds of the inexperienced” or ignorant 
who have been corrupted by bribery meaning the common people of Rome (227). 
Therefore, I argue that this sums up the overarching belief of the Populares from the 
Optimates point of view, believing that the people are not wise or experienced enough to 
make decisions on what is best for Rome, and they utilize immoral behaviors to attain 
power.  
On the other hand, Caesar does not seem to engage as much with a description of 
the Populares except when he is describing himself, a member of the Populares faction, 
and justifying his own actions. Basically, he lauds his exsitimationem dignitatumque or 
“dignity and reputation” especially in his role as commander of his army for the past nine 
years, and even states that he had only reckoned with “dignity of the republic of first 
importance and preferable to life" (Caesar 15). Caesar seems to be distinguishing himself 
as a man who has the interests of the Republic at heart, as opposed to the self-interest 
Senate that he previously called out, and he also is fighting back against the corrupt 
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description that Cicero provides of Populares leaders such as his desire to restore the 
fundamental rights of the tribunes of the plebs  (35). Finally, Caesar states that the way in 
which he is going to outdo the decisions of the Senate that is actively working against 
him is with iustitia et aequitate or “justice and equity” (51). He seems to be once again 
attempting to affirm that he is only making these military moves against the Senate and 
Pompey specifically because he believes that it is in the best interest of the people of 
Rome. Overall though, Caesar does not explicitly mention anything regarding the beliefs 
of the Populares, but instead chooses to speak about his commendable character which 
serves as a contrast to Cicero’s portrayal of Populares politicians. However, both Caesar 
and Cicero, along with Sallust, go into great detail about what constitutes a good citizen 
and bad citizen, which one can only infer is meant to subtly describe the members of their 
opposing political ideology.  
 Interestingly, Cicero and Caesar both present similar language regarding the 
characteristics of an ideal citizen even though they both seemed to be referencing 
different groups of people who exemplify these traits. For Cicero, these qualities were 
exemplified by the Roman Senate, and were the traits that made them better equipped to 
make decisions for the state. He emphasizes that this aristocratic class is integrii or 
“virtuous” and sapientibus or “wise” (223). Similarly, he advises that men ought to 
imitate these qualities of the Roman Senate, or as he calls them “the leading men of the 
State,” such as their dignitatem, laudem, and gloriam meaning “dignity, praise, and 
glory” (157). Cicero argues that because the Senate possess these qualities, they do 
indeed defend the interests of the people. Similarly, in order to accommodate and 
advocate for the various interests and needs of the people, one must have magni animi, 
 39 
magni ingenii, magnae constantiae meaning an “exalted spirit, great ability, and great 
resolution,” which is what these aristocratic men have according to Cicero (171). This 
again serves to elevate the Roman senators and their character above that of the Roman 
people in hopes of proving that they are more qualified to create laws.  
Similarly, Caesar also agrees that dignitatem is a quality of the ideal citizen and 
unsurprisingly, something that he himself strives for, claiming it is “dearer than life 
itself” (Cicero 17). That is the extent of how these two politicians view an ideal citizen 
and those fit for governance. However, Sallust seems to provide a broader view of the 
qualities that describe a good citizen, and values that men should strive to attain. Like 
Cicero and Caesar, Sallust talk about dignitas or “dignity,” specifically in terms of the 
Senators, in his work on the war against Catiline (111). Additionally, he mentions pudore 
and virtutue meaning “modesty and virtue” as morals that were found in politics and 
governance when he first joined in this field as a young man (25). He argues that the 
government authority, most likely including the Roman Senate, formerly was the optumo 
and iutissumo or the “best and most just” (37). More generally, in his work The War 
Against Jugurtha, Sallust identifies honesty, diligence, and virtue again as good qualities 
of moral men that one ought to strive for. Overall though, Sallust frames these traits as 
things of the past and begins to outline the values that categorize the Roman governance 
at the time of his writing.  
 In a similar fashion, Cicero outlines negative qualities that represent a bad citizen 
which he attributes to those who support the Populares ideology or the general public. 
Specifically, he points out the temeritatem of the people or the “rashness and 
thoughtlessness,” saying that the Senate dreaded the “impetuosity of the masses” (Cicero 
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177). This supports the line of thought adopted by the Optimates who believe that the 
Senate possesses the correct temperament and values that are ideal for governance, and 
therefore, they should have a larger influence in lawmaking. Meanwhile, they also 
believed that the general masses were not suitable for governance and did not have the 
right nature to make the best decisions for Rome. Additionally, Cicero touches upon the 
cupiditas or the “desires” of the people, and how those desires do not agree with the 
opinions of the leading men. Again, I believe Cicero is attempting to argue that the 
common people allow their own personal desires supersede the interests of the State and 
therefore, make them unfit for lawmaking.  
Finally, Cicero addresses the threat of conversiones and seditio meaning 
“revolution and riots,” arguing that in contrast to the leading men with great and sound 
minds, talking about the Senate, there are some men who wish to incite revolution and 
change the government (185). He goes on to explain how these men who wish to 
overthrow the government either are involved in criminal behavior, financial 
embarrassment, or have an inborn revolutionary madness (Cicero, 104). He says this in 
contrast to the “great” and “exalted” that the Roman senators possess, therefore providing 
a clear moral distinction between the two groups of people. It is clear that Cicero is 
depicting the men who are attacking the Roman Senate as amoral and less equipped to 
make laws.  
 Caesar speaks only briefly about his perspective on the less desirable traits of the 
aristocrats who he deems as bad citizens. Specifically, he employs the same language 
Cicero did previously to describe the masses and accuses the Senate or possessing an 
acerbitatem or “harshness” that has been unfairly inflicted upon him and the people (51). 
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Additionally and more broadly, he accuses the Senate of having tenuis atque infirmi haec 
animi or “petty and feeble character” more specifically in the context of their willingness 
to align with Pompey’s wishes (51). However, it is interesting that Caesar seems to 
employ similar rhetoric to describe the Optimates and the ways in which they fall short as 
Roman citizens, clearly attempting to expose their corrupt nature.  
Sallust also supports this line of thought in “The Conspiracy of Cataline,” and 
argues that the politics of the Late Roman Republic have been contaminated with 
corruption and immoral men. He speaks of largitio and avaritia meaning “bribery and 
greed,” and how he found these values in politics when he joined as a young man (25). 
Similarly, he also speaks about how luxuria or “extravagance” is what spurred Cataline 
on in his actions against Roman governance (29). Referring specifically to the Roman 
government which most likely includes the Roman Senate, Sallust states that he has seen 
cruel and intolerable men. Finally, he also asserts that ignoble men will use dolis atque 
fallaciis meaning “craft and deception” in order to gain power and political office, 
seemingly arguing that these men are in existence in the Roman Republic (37). These are 
Sallust’s perceptions regarding the decline of morality in politics since the expulsion of 
the kings to the Late Roman Republic in which he is writing, so it seems relevant to 
include these evaluations in our discussion.   
 Lastly, these authors briefly also touch upon the values and ideals that Rome itself 
was built upon which serve to remind the author not only the important facets of 
government, but also how these different political groups are attempting to preserve these 
ideas. For Cicero, he highlights the protection of libertatem or “liberty, “and how the 
Senators are always attempting to ensure the liberty and the wishes of the people of 
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Rome (225). Additionally, Cicero does argue that the Senate is upholding the “judgment 
of the Roman people” or the iudicium populi which legitimizes the Roman government 
and claims that the Populares are not actually friends of the people after all (189). This 
seems to be a fair analysis considering that many of the Populares leaders also come from 
privileged backgrounds, and in actions such as Caesar’s, it seems that the support of the 
people is used as a way in which an individual can gain more personal power and detract 
power from the Senate.  
Caesar also touches upon ideals and guarantees of the Roman Republic. More 
specifically, he shifts his focus onto how government ought to be making decisions rei 
publicae causa and rei publicae commode meaning for the “sake of the commonwealth” 
and to the “Republic’s advantage” which he actually claims that this is what Pompey 
thought he was doing when he was going against Caesar (17). Additionally though, 
Caesar adds that it was not only in the interest of the Republic, but also the communis 
salutis or “general welfare” that him and Pompey have a face to face interaction and 
restore order (39). Speaking more generally, Sallust affirms these ideas that the iussi 
populi or “order of the people” is a key facet of the Republic and gives the Senate and 
magistrates their power (67).  
 Overall, these five categories outline the language that was utilized by politicians 
and historians of the Late Roman Republic to understand and critique both the Optimates 
and Populares schools of thought, along with the health of Roman governance in general. 
I argue that this analysis has allowed for a more in depth understanding of how people 
thought about these two political factions, and how members from these ideologies 
argued in favor of themselves and their perspective on the representation and lawmaking. 
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Ultimately, these identified words and phrases will serve useful in identifying similarities 
among the perspectives and implementation of representation in the American context, 
and how that comparison can inform our modern view on the effectiveness and role of 
the United States Senate.  
Comparison to the 18th Century United States 
Switching gears, I wanted to compare my findings from the Late Roman 
Republic, and the arguments presented by the Optimates and the Populares, to my 
findings from the American context and the differing perspectives regarding 
representation in the United States. Specifically, I chose to draw my focus to written texts 
from the early years after America’s founding that not only established the expectations 
and role of elected representatives, but also revealed conflicting opinions regarding how 
institutions like the Senate should be set up. I looked at key documents such as the 
Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution in order to understand 
the explicit language regarding this political debate. Additionally, I utilized two texts 
from Hamilton, Madison, and Jay’s collection of essays defending the Constitution 
known as the Federalist Papers, along with two anonymous essays by authors with 
pseudonyms, known by the names “Federal Farmer” and “Brutus,” who present the 
Antifederalist’s perspective and concerns with this new governing document.  
Specifically, I am looking to highlight the language and arguments employed by 
these early politicians and political factions that explained their views on the most 
effective structure of representation and their opinions on the Trustee versus Delegate 
model of Representation in order to compare trends in logic and rhetoric between that of 
the Optimates and Populares. I utilized roughly the same five coding categories that I 
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used in the Roman context to analyze these primary sources, amending them a bit to 
better capture the subject matter and institutions that these authors are writing about. 
Therefore, the categories I chose included 1) the language used to describe qualities that 
representatives ought to have, 2) qualities of the common people, 3) the ideals or facets 
of democracy that the country was built on, and 4) explicit references or arguments for or 
against both Trustee and Delegate models of representation. Overall, I was able to find 
many instances of overlap between the language and ideology of the political debate laid 
out in the Roman Republic and that which categorized the years following America’s 
founding. This comparison seeks to show a clear line of thought between the competing 
political ideologies that categorized the Roman republic and the United States, and 
highlights the significance in drawing connections to these ancient cultures.  
Similar to the Roman authors and politicians, these documents expend a 
considerable amount of time outlining the specific values and tenets of democracy that 
are crucial to the success and health of the United States which should not come as a 
surprise since this is the time period when American governance was being constructed 
and amended. Many of these ideas share the same sentiments and ideals of those outlined 
in the Late Roman Republic with even some authors like Hamilton and Madison 
explicitly stating their inspiration from Ancient Greece and Rome. For example, 
Hamilton consumed a significant amount of the writings of philosophers in his time, one 
of whom being Cicero (Chernow 110). The Declaration of Independence mainly serves 
as a compelling source for these ideas, outlining values like “safety” along with “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as important foundations for their new government, 
similar to how Cicero speaks about the importance of libertatem or “liberty” in the Pro 
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Sestio. Significantly, the document twice highlights the “right(s) of the people,” for the 
purpose of calling out the British government’s previous abuse of these rights and 
emphasizing the people’s rights to alter of abolish this new government as Thomas Paine 
spelled out in his pamphlet “Common Sense” (Declaration). I argue this is similar in 
nature to Cicero’s mention to the “judgement of the people” in which both arguments are 
clearly acknowledging the importance of the people’s voice in governance (Cicero 189).  
Federalist Paper 57 also reaffirms this belief by speaking about the “responsibility 
to the people” that representatives have in their role which again endorses the idea that 
the opinions of the people are embedded into governance in both Rome and the United 
States. This document also speaks that the men serving in American governance must 
have the virtue and character to pursue “the common good of society” which draws 
comparisons back to Cicero’s argument in favor of the Optimates, claiming that these 
aristocratic men or Senators are ultimately making decisions on what is best for the State. 
Cicero creates a list of the characteristics and morals that the Roman Senate possess that 
make them more qualified for governance, and Madison seems to be partially buying into 
that argument in the sense that representatives must have merit and virtue in order to 
serve.  
The Constitution of the United States also offers important ideas and values that 
the founders were hoping to establish in this new government such as providing for the 
“common defense” and “promot[ing] the general welfare” along with reiterating again 
the protection of “liberty” (Constitution). This is practically plucked from the pages of 
Caesar’s Bellum Civile where he speaks about the “interest of the people and the general 
welfare” of the State (39). Like Cicero, the founders of American democracy thought that 
 46 
government ought to both preserve the values that the country was built on and 
acknowledged the significance of the judgement of the people in governance.  
Moving on, I shifted my focus to coding not only the specific expectations of 
representatives clearly delineated in the Constitution, but also the differing perspectives 
regarding the ideal character of representatives. Thinking more specifically in terms of 
explicit responsibilities and requirements of representatives, the Constitution spells out 
the age requirements of  25 and 30 that one must be in order to be elected to the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, along with duties that are exclusive to either 
chamber such as the House’s authority to “originate revenue bills” or the Senate’s “sole 
power to try all impeachments” (Constitution). Additionally in section 8, the Constitution 
also grants the United States Congress what is known as implied powers by stating that 
these two institutions have the power to make all laws which they deem “necessary and 
proper” (Constitution). This has been a source for major debate where Alexander 
Hamilton argued for an expansive understanding of this clause in order to “free 
government from unforeseen emergencies” (Chernow 355). On the other hand, Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison, who helped author the Constitution and the clause itself, 
argued for a more restrictive interpretation of the law and thought that all policies must 
pass a “strict test of being absolutely necessary” so as to avoid the legislative branch from 
acquiring too much power (Chernow 355). Hamilton argued against that notion, citing the 
difficulty in objectively determining if something is necessary which seems like a fair 
critique. From this language alone that is employed in the Constitution, it seems that the 
Constitution is promoting a more Trustee model of representation by including this rather 
vague clause which seems to allow representatives to use their own discretion when 
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creating laws. Additionally, there seems to be no explicit mention of a representative’s 
responsibility to act solely or at all on their constituent’s interests.  
Federalist Paper 57 and Federalist Paper 10 both provide the Federalists’ 
argument in favor of the way representation was structured in the Constitution while also 
attempting to dispel the criticism regarding their preference for a Trustee model. In 
Federalist 10, Madison spends some time outlining the qualities of men who are to be 
chosen as representatives such as “patriotism” and a “love of justice” (Madison). More 
significantly though, he argues that this chosen group of individuals must have “wisdom” 
so that they are able to “discern the true interest” of the country which gets right to the 
argument of the Trustee model and also presents similar logic to the Optimates school of 
thought. They are arguing that these representatives or those in governance, in the case of 
Rome, are more equipped and knowledgeable than the common people to make decisions 
in the best interest of their countries and therefore, ought to use that wisdom to have a 
greater influence in lawmaking. Similarly, this document also claims that rulers must 
possess the “most virtue” in order to pursue “the common good of the society” which 
goes hand in hand with the argument used by Cicero to support the Roman Senate and the 
Optimates. Similar to Madison, Cicero also mentioned the Senate’s integri or “virtue, 
upright” nature, and both men clearly found this quality to be a cornerstone to the best 
means of governance.  
Federalist Paper 57 seems to present a defense against the claim that the Trustee 
model of representation will breed only an aristocratic class in governance and that the 
interests of the rural citizens will not be represented. While it focuses on the House of 
Representatives as opposed to the Senate, he states that the Constitution promotes the 
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“rights and pretensions” of all, even every “class and description of citizens” (Madison). 
Madison goes on to argue that the people are the ones who will be electing these 
representatives, and therefore, they have direct influence in what type of individual is 
elected, arguing that neither the “rich, more than the poor” or the “learned, more than 
ignorant” are electing these people (Madison). This seems like an important distinction to 
make in terms of the Federalists’ position and the argument for a Trustee model since it 
clearly delineates how the body of citizens exercise their “judgement,” as previously 
mentioned, or their voice to influence legislation by choosing to vote for candidates who 
are more aligned with their beliefs or who present a certain identity. This deviates from 
what we saw in the context of Rome in which clearly the Roman Senate was primarily 
composed of elite politicians who were born into their station in life, and the Roman 
people did not have the power to vote out these aristocratic Senators out since their 
appointment was for life. Therefore, it is interesting to see how Cicero and the Optimates 
choose to just accept and embrace the title of aristocrats, while Madison in the Federalist 
Papers is attempting to counteract that attack since American revolutionaries were 
focused on rebelling against the tyranny and abuses of aristocratic Britain.  
However, on the flip side, the anonymous Antifederalist author Brutus, likely 
Robert Yates, in his 1787 essay “To the People of the State of New-York” offered a 
somewhat different perspective on the expectation of a representative in the United States 
per the Constitution. Countering the idea of representatives possessing some innate 
wisdom to make decisions, Brutus argues that those in power ought to hold the “same 
feelings” and “aim at the same objects as the people do,” adding that it is those people 
who “transfer” them their authority (Brutus). This stance is clearly advocating for 
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representation that aligns more with the Delegate model in which representatives should 
be directly relying on the interests of the people to make decisions and policy. I 
especially think it is significant to highlight Brutus’ argument that the people “transfer” 
authority to these representatives, in which clearly he believes that the people are the 
ones giving the officials their power and therefore, these officials are responsible to honor 
that symbiotic relationship. This line of thought seems to closely resemble the beliefs of 
the Populares who claim that the opinions of the people should ultimately have the 
greatest say in governance, and it is the people, or as Sallust puts it in The Conspiracy of 
Cataline, the populi iussi or “order to the people,” who gives the consul and the 
magistrates power (67).  
Moving forward, in support of their argument for the Trustee model, Federalist 
Paper 10 also seems to briefly touch upon the perceived characteristics, actions, and 
capabilities of the common people and the masses that make them ill equipped to 
recognize what is in the best interest of the State and to ultimately, influence governance. 
Specifically, Madison highlights the danger in the formation of factions among the 
people, and that the “violence of factions” can only be repressed by a “well-constructed 
union” (Madison). Adding to his argument, he goes on to present the fear of an 
“interested and overbearing majority” who will overtake the rights or interests of a minor 
party or even worse, completely neglect the public good (Madison). Clearly, Madison is 
conveying his perspective on the dangers that might occur if the people yield too much 
power in governance, and their interests are directly translated into laws. Instead, he 
seems to be laying the foundation of the necessity for representatives who possess those 
previously mentioned qualities to make decisions that are in the best interest of the 
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country and do not give in to the interest of conflicting factions. This refers back to 
Rehfeld’s assertion that a key component of the Trustee model of representation is that 
representatives should not be reliant on “external sanctities” or parties which is exactly 
what Madison is arguing here (Rehfeld 218). I also think this is a fear that was shared by 
the Roman Optimates, believing that the general public did not have the qualifications to 
best make decisions or laws on behalf of the State and that the multitude of differing 
interests would cause chaos to governance such as when Cicero speaks to the threat of 
conversiones and seditio or “revolutions” and “riots” (Pro Sestio 185). 
Additionally, Madison claims that “instability, injustice, and confusion” are often 
“introduced in public councils,” which he believes are the “mortal disease” of 
government (Madison). This is an interesting point to make and directly refers to a 
similar sentiment posed by Cicero that I had not mentioned in my previous discussion of 
the Roman text. Cicero in his Pro Sestio legal speech touches upon the contiones or 
“informal meetings” held by the plebeians in Rome which he claims are one of three 
places in which the opinions of the people can be heard (179). These informal assemblies 
have not been as heavily researched as the formal voting assemblies like the curiate, 
tribal, and centuriate, but it is clear that they took up a significant space in the Roman 
political process (Morstein-Marx 35). Along with serving as the “chief conduit of 
authoritative information” to the common citizens, these meetings and the opinions that 
came out of these meetings ultimately would make their way back to the Senate and 
Magistrates and could have a large hand in deciding the fate of bills (Morstein-Marx 35). 
Therefore, similar to Madison’s point, Cicero claimed that the leaders of the Populares 
would use these meetings to incite the people and cause riots, ultimately fearing that they 
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would undermine the authority and wisdom of the Senate in exchange for their own 
selfish interests (Pro Sestio 179).  
These evaluations of the character of the general public both in the Roman 
context and the American context seems to argue that these politicians did not think the 
majority of people were fit or possessed the right temperament to govern effectively and 
they should then subsequently place their trust in the hands of those, like the Senators, 
who are equipped. Hamilton seemed to support this idea as well, and even likened 
Jefferson to the character and actions of Caesar. Ron Chernow states that on numerous 
occasions Hamilton referred to Jefferson as Caesar, believing him to be a “populist 
demagogue”(398) and “the worst sort of tyrant” (407). This is an interesting distinction to 
point out for two reasons. First off, it is clear that Hamilton and most likely the other 
founding fathers were both well-read and influenced by the actions of the ancient 
Romans and Greeks, which is clear the similar language and government structures that 
have previously been identified in my research along with the Roman and Greek 
pseudonyms that were often employed in their writings. Secondly, and more importantly, 
Hamilton seems to be pointing out that Jefferson does not actually represent the people 
and instead, is capitalizing on his popular support. Again, this brings up whether 
descriptive representation is a key facet of the delegate model of representation and the 
Federalists and the Optimates seem to be pointing out this hypocrisy.  
Finally, both the Federalist Papers and the two essays penned by Antifederalist 
authors present specific critiques to both the concepts of a Trustee model of 
representation and a Delegate model, and dive deeper into the ideological differences 
between the two schools of thought. Similarly, all these texts attempt to combat the 
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concerns and arguments of their conflicting viewpoint. The Antifederalist writers Brutus 
and the Federal Farmer seem to focus their essays mostly on attacking the Federalist 
perspective on representation, as opposed to spending too much time defending and 
supporting representation that is more closely aligned with the Delegate model. Both 
writers touch upon and argue this idea that a “few men of wealth” (Federal Farmer) or the 
“will of a few”(Brutus) are having too great an influence in the government under the 
new Constitution. Brutus argues that the number of representatives that were determined 
by this new governing document is “so small a number” that it “could not resemble the 
people” and their interests (Brutus).  
The Federal Farmer author also brings up the differing interests and specific 
identities of Southern, Eastern, and Middle states, and argues that there are such 
differences in opinion and customs that will most likely be neglected by such few 
representatives who cannot possibly represent the all of their views. Additionally, the 
Federal Farmer actually goes so far to call these few men the “natural aristocracy of the 
country” which I argue draws striking similarities to the perspectives that the Roman 
Populares had regarding the Optimates who they deemed an aristocratic breed (Federal 
Farmer). These two writings are confirming the fear that representatives will favor the 
interests of the wealthy and not the diverse interests of the rest of the county. Ultimately, 
both essays seem to be attempting to make the same argument that the middle and lower 
classes will be excluded from this new method of representation.  
Additionally, these texts also argue that this form of representation will breed 
corruption and immorality within governance. Because of the discretion and 
responsibilities allocated to representatives under the Constitution, Brutus claims that 
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there will be representatives who will “pursue private ends” and will in result “sacrifice 
the public good” (Brutus). The Federal Farmer supports this claim and argues that it 
provides “an open door to improper regulations” (Federal Farmer). On that point, the 
Federal Farmer author is referring to the fact that Congress has the power to regulate 
elections and claims that people in the cities will therefore control the representatives 
who are chosen, further excluding those poor citizens living in rural communities. That is 
a significant point to address, and it contributes to the debate and concerns regarding the 
stark class divisions between constituents and their elected officials, which clearly was 
felt in the Late Roman Republic as well. These two authors do not provide a solution to 
these issues or an alternative method of representation, but I argue their critiques are 
significant and offers similar sentiments to the Roman Populares.  
The Federalist Papers 10 and 57 both attempt to counter these claims against 
them, and also provide support for the Trustee Model. In Federalist 57, Madison claims 
that “merit” should be the key determinant to be a representative and that officials should 
be elected on this basis. Additionally Madison supports this claim in Federalist 10, stating 
that representatives must have “diffusive and established characters” which I argue feeds 
into that merit which Madison mentions (Madison). This is an important tenet of the 
argument for the Trustee model in which these representatives are only qualified to 
employ their own personal discretion and experiences in governance because of their 
objective merit and that is what keeps them from abusing their power and harming the 
State. A representative’s aptitude and virtue in lawmaking is key to ensuring those values 
of liberty and prosperity that the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence so 
clearly laid out as the foundations of American government. Additionally, Madison 
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brings up a fair argument in Federalist Paper 10 in which he states that men are not fit “to 
be a judge in [their] own case” because if that were the case, there would certainly be 
personal bias which would “corrupt his integrity” (Madison). Therefore, Madison argues 
that the “enlightened statesmen” as he calls them must rectify this issue by not yielding 
solely to the interests of the majority (Madison). While differing in the sense that Roman 
Senators were not elected by the people, this perspective on the “merit” of government 
officials draws comparisons to the Roman Optimates who clearly viewed themselves as 
more “enlightened” than the plebeians and therefore, ought to have more influence in 
lawmaking.  
Finally, the Federalist Papers do seem to push back against the accusation that this 
method of representation and America’s new governance as a whole created an oligarchy 
or a government run by only a small group of elite individuals. Madison asserts that this 
idea of an oligarchy is the “most extraordinary” and refutes this claim by asserting that 
the people themselves hold the power to elect their rulers and that their aim should be 
electing those with virtue. Similarly, he asks how the House of Representatives “favors 
the elevation of the few,” and counters this claim by asserting that men from all 
backgrounds, including socio-economic, are included in the United States electorate and 
participate in choosing their own representatives. In Federalist 10, Madison actually 
argues that a “small number of citizens elected by the rest” is one of the greatest facets of 
a Republic. He argues that this is the best mode of representation in terms of ensuring the 
“true interest of the country” while also taking into account the “public views” since the 
interests of the general public can be tainted by their self-interest (Madison). This idea of 
the “power of a few” was also a critique of the Roman Optimates as the Populares leaders 
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and the Roman people believed that it was primarily only those born into the aristocratic 
class who were able to gain entrance into significant political offices. It is a significant 
connection because it further aligns the political ideologies of the Populares with those 
who supported a delegate model of representation.  
Overall, I argue that the debate regarding representation in the United States has 
strong comparisons to the political differences of the Roman Populares and Optimates. 
Not only do both contexts utilize similar ideals and values with which their government 
was founded on, but it seems that similar issues regarding socioeconomic class divisions 
and expectations of those who are governing are present in both time periods. Although 
the political institutions and structure of governance are significantly different in Late 
Roman Republic and the United States, the debates between who ought to have a greater 
influence in lawmaking seems to transcend those differences. Ultimately, my research 
has highlighted the trend in political thought and debate between the Roman Republic 
and the United States, and hopefully, will encourage further scholarship on the 
significance of drawing links to these ancient cultures.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, my research has identified key rhetoric and logic that connects the 
conflict between the Roman Populares and Optimates to the ongoing debate in American 
politics regarding the trustee model and the delegate model of representation. In 
summary, the basis of the arguments employed by the Roman Optimates centered around 
the idea that the Senators, mostly composed of elite aristocrats, possessed greater wisdom 
and virtue than the mass of Roman citizens. Therefore, they argued that their approval 
ought to be a more essential part of the lawmaking process. Similarly, early American 
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political thinkers like James Madison argued for a similar stance in terms of how 
representation should be constructed in the United States, favoring the Trustee model 
which claimed that representative ought to possess some greater wisdom and worldview 
that makes them better equipped to make decisions on behalf of the State. On the flip 
side, the Roman Populares clearly felt like the Roman Senate was a breeding ground for 
corruption and ultimately, failed to represent the interests of all citizens which I argue is 
consistent with the critiques of those like the American Antifederalists who favored 
representation that more closely aligns with the delegate model. This comparison 
between the conflict of the Optimates and Populares and the debate between the trustee 
and delegate model or representation is one that has not been highlighted in previous 
research, and it was beneficial to look at these ideological similarities between these 
political factions in order to better understand the most effective modes of representation. 
However, even more important, I believe this research has a modern application, 
especially when looking at the concerns that were presented by both ideological stances, 
arguing that these are concerns that are still being debated in United States governance.  
As previously highlighted throughout the course of my research, it seems that 
none of these political schools of thought seem to fall short of providing descriptive 
representation. Instead, the debate centers around whether the interests of the people 
ought to be represented or whether it ought to be left in the hands of those who are more 
experienced to govern but does not seem to require that a representative descriptively 
look like their constituents. Ultimately, this opens up room for further research on 
whether the lack of descriptive representation undermines the arguments of the Populares 
and the Antifederalists, or if the United States ought to require this type of representation 
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more explicitly like other countries have done through vehicles like quota laws or other 
systems.  
The key takeaway of my research is identifying the link between these two 
political debates which will hopefully open up the door to future research. My findings 
are simply compiling the extent and essence of the debates that categorized the Roman 
Republic and the United States but does not seek to make an evaluation on which 
ideology seems to be more effective and ethical in terms of governance. Hopefully, future 
research can utilize my findings in order to predict future implications or consequences 
by referencing the political outcomes of the Romans that the United States could face, 
since it is clear that similar rhetoric and debates are still present in today’s modern 
political climate. Finally, I hope that this research highlights the importance and 
relevance of looking back and analyzing ancient cultures and encourages others to do the 
same.   
Overall, my research was successful in identifying key similarities between the 
political conflict of the Roman Optimates and Populares and the conflict regarding 
representation that categorized both America’s founding years and our modern political 
debates. I was able to analyze similar language and rhetoric employed from both 
contexts, and present a thorough understanding of the ideologies that were being argued 
along with the benefits and downfalls of both methods of governance. I hope that my 
research can be used to help identify ways in which we can refine the roles and 
expectations of representation in the United States, so that the interests of the country are 
being represented in governance over the personal interests of elected officials. 
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Additionally, my findings can speak to future research regarding the quality of 
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